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1 Introduction
Consider a long-term relationship between an agent who has persistent private information
and a principal who cannot commit to long-term contracts. If the parties are sufficiently
forward-looking, then the relationship is subject to the ratchet effect: the agent is unwill-
ing to disclose his private information, fearing that the principal will update the terms of
his contract. This limits the principal’s ability to learn the agent’s private information,
and reduces her value from the relationship.
The ratchet effect literature has shed light on many economic applications including
planning problems (Freixas et al., 1985), labor contracting (Gibbons, 1987; Dewatripont,
1989), regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1988), optimal taxation (Dillen and Lundholm,
1996), repeated buyer-seller relationships (Hart and Tirole, 1988; Schmidt, 1993), and
relational contracting (Halac, 2012; Malcomson, 2016).
A natural feature in virtually all of these applications is that productivity shocks to the
economy have the potential to change the incentive environment over time. In this paper,
we show that the classic ratchet effect results may not hold when the principal-agent
relationship is subject to time-varying productivity shocks. In particular, the principal
may gradually learn the agent’s private information, which increases the value that she
obtains from the relationship over time. The principal may even achieve her first-best
payoff in the long run.
We study a stochastic game played between a principal and an agent. At each period,
the principal offers the agent a transfer in exchange for taking an action that benefits
her. The principal is able to observe the agent’s action, but the agent’s cost of taking the
action is his private information, and constant over time. The principal has short-term,
but not long-term, commitment power: she can credibly promise to pay a transfer in the
current period if the agent takes the action, but cannot commit to future transfers. The
realization of a productivity shock affects the size of the benefit that the principal obtains
from having the agent take the action. The realization of the current period shock is
publicly observed by both the principal and the agent at the start of the period, and the
shock evolves over time as a Markov process.
Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993) study the special case of our model in
which productivity is constant over time. We show how the equilibrium of this special
case differs qualitatively from the equilibrium of our model in which productivity changes
over time. The three main differences as follows.
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First, we find that in the presence of productivity shocks the equilibrium may be
persistently inefficient. This contrasts with the equilibrium of the model without the
shocks, which is efficient.
Second, productivity shocks give the principal the opportunity to progressively learn
the agent’s private information. As a result, the principal’s value from the relationship
gradually improves over time. We show that under natural assumptions, the principal is
only able to get the agent to disclose some of his private information when productivity is
low; that is, learning takes place in “bad times.” We also show that productivity shocks
may enable the principal to obtain profits that are arbitrarily close to her full commitment
profits. Lastly, we derive conditions under which the principal ends up fully learning the
agent’s private information and attains her first-best payoffs in the long-run.
Third, we show that learning by the principal may be path dependent: the degree to
which the principal learns the agent’s private information may depend critically on the
order in which productivity shocks were realized early on in the relationship. This is true
even when the process governing the evolution of productivity is ergodic. As a result,
early shocks can have a lasting impact on the principal’s value from the relationship.
Our model generates two testable predictions. First, the agent’s performance will
typically be higher after the realization of negative productivity shocks. This is consistent
with Lazear et al. (2016), who find evidence that workers’ productivity increases following
a recession. Second, there will be hysteresis in the agent’s compensation: the current wage
of the agent is negatively affected by previous negative shocks. This resonates with Kahn
(2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012), who find evidence that recessions have a long lasting
impact on workers’ compensation.
The key feature of our model that drives these dynamics is that the agent’s incentive
to conceal his private information changes over time. When current productivity is low
and the future looks dim, the informational rents that low cost types expect to earn by
mimicking a higher cost type are small. When these rents are small, it is cheap for the
principal to get a low cost agent to reveal his private information. These changes in the
cost of inducing information disclosure make it possible for the principal to progressively
screen the different types of agents, giving rise to our equilibrium dynamics.
Related literature. Our work relates to prior papers that have suggested different ways
of mitigating the ratchet effect. Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) show that competition for
second-hand workers may alleviate the ratchet effect. Carmichael and MacLeod (2000)
show that the threat of future punishment may deter the principal from updating the
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terms of the agent’s contract, mitigating the ratchet effect. Fiocco and Strausz (2015)
show that the principal can incentivize information disclosure by delegating contracting
to an independent third party. Our paper differs from these studies in that we do not
introduce external sources of contract enforcement, nor do we reintroduce commitment
by allowing for non-Markovian strategies.
Instead, we focus on the role that shocks play in ameliorating the principal’s com-
mitment problem. This connects our paper with Ortner (2017), who considers a durable
goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and who faces time-varying production
costs. In contrast to the classic results on the Coase conjecture (Fudenberg et al., 1985;
Gul et al., 1986), Ortner (2017) shows that time-varying costs may enable the monopolist
to extract rents from high value buyers. A key difference between Ortner (2017) and the
current paper is that the interaction between the monopolist and buyers is one-shot in
the Coasian environment. As a result, issues of information revelation, which are central
to the current paper, are absent in that model.1
Blume (1998) generalizes the Hart and Tirole (1988) model to a setting in which
the consumer’s valuation has both permanent and transient components. Blume (1998)
shows that optimal renegotiation-proof contracts in this environment give the buyer the
chance to exit in the future in case his valuation falls. Gerardi and Maestri (2015) study a
dynamic contracting model with no commitment in which the agent’s private information
affects his marginal cost of effort. They find that the principal’s lack of commitment may
lead her to offer inefficient pooling contracts.
Our model is strategically equivalent to a setting in which the agent has at each period
an outside option, whose value varies over time and is publicly observed. This relates our
model to papers studying how outside options affect equilibrium dynamics in the classic
Coasian model (Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2010; Board and Pycia, 2014; Hwang and Li, 2017).2
The key difference, again, is that we study the effect that time-varying outside options
have in settings with repeated interaction.3
1The current paper also differs from Ortner (2017) in terms of results. Ortner (2017) shows that
the monopolist’s ability to extract rents diminishes as the support of the distribution of consumer values
becomes dense. In contrast, the equilibrium dynamics of our model hold independently of how dense the
support of the agent’s cost distribution is.
2See also Compte and Jehiel (2002), who study the effect that outside options have in models of
reputational bargaining.
3Our model also relates to Kennan (2001), who studies a bilateral bargaining game in which a long-
run seller faces a long-run buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation, which evolves over
time as a Markov chain. Kennan (2001) shows that time-varying private information gives rise to cycles
in which the seller’s offer depends on the buyer’s past purchasing decisions.
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The path-dependence result relates our paper to a series of recent studies in organi-
zation economics that attempt to explain the persistent performance differences among
seemingly identical firms (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). Chassang (2010) shows that
path-dependence may arise when a principal must learn how to effectively monitor the
agent. Li and Matouschek (2013) study relational contracting environments in which the
principal has private information, and show that this private information may give rise
to cycles. Callander and Matouschek (2014) show that persistent performance differences
may arise when managers engage in trial and error experimentation. Halac and Prat
(2016) show that path-dependence arises due to the agent’s changing beliefs about the
principal’s monitoring ability. We add to this literature by providing a new explanation
for persistent performance differences, with new testable implications. Our results imply
that firms that experience negative shocks earlier will later be more productive.
Finally, our paper relates to a broader literature on dynamic games with private infor-
mation (Hart, 1985; Sorin, 1999; Wiseman, 2005; Peski, 2008, 2014). In this literature our
paper relates closely to work by Watson (1999, 2002), who studies a private information
partnership game, and shows that the value of the partnership increases over time as the
players gradually increase the stakes of their relationship to screen out bad types.
2 Two Period Example
Consider the following two-period game played between a principal and an agent. At
t = 0, the agent learns her cost of work c ∈ {cL, cH}. Let µ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability
that the agent’s cost is cL. At the start of each period t = 0, 1, the principal’s benefit
bt ∈ {bL, bH} from having the agent work is publicly revealed. After observing bt, the
principal offers the agent a transfer Tt ≥ 0 for working. The agent then publicly chooses
whether or not to work. The payoffs of the principal and an agent of type c are
(1− δ)(b0 − T0)a0 + δ(b1 − T1)a1,
(1− δ)(T0 − c)a0 + δ(T1 − c)a1,
where at ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not the agent works in period t = 0, 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1)
measures the importance of period t = 1 relative to period t = 0. We assume
0 ≤ cL < bL < cH < bH and µ < bH − cH
bH − cL =: µ
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Lastly, we assume that the benefit bt is drawn i.i.d. over time, with prob(bt = bL) = q ∈
[0, 1] for t = 0, 1. We consider pure strategy equilibria of this game.
Consider play at t = 1. Since we focus on pure strategy equilibria, on path at the start
of t = 1 the principal’ beliefs are equal to her prior or are degenerate. If the principal’s
beliefs are equal to her prior, she finds it optimal to offer a transfer T1 = cH that both
types accept if b1 = bH (since µ < µ), and she finds it optimal to offer transfer T1 = cL
that only a low cost type accepts if b1 = bL. If the principal learned that the agent’s cost
is c, she finds it optimal to offer T1 = c, which the agent accepts if and only if b1 > c.
Consider now play at t = 0. Suppose first that b0 = bL. In this case, the principal
must choose between two options: make a low offer that both types reject, or make
a higher offer that only the low cost type accepts. Making an offer that both types
accept is not profitable since bL < cH . Suppose the principal makes a separating offer
T0 that only a low cost type accepts. Note that a low cost agent reveals his private
information by accepting, so his payoff is (1 − δ)(T0 − cL) + δ0. Also note that the low
cost type can obtain a payoff of δ(1− q)(cH − cL) by rejecting the offer, so we must have
T0 ≥ cL + δ1−δ (1 − q)(cH − cL). Since the high cost type rejects offer T0 if and only if
T0 ≤ cH , we must have cH ≥ cL + δ1−δ (1− q)(cH − cL), or
δ
1− δ (1− q) ≤ 1. (1)
When the future is sufficiently valuable (i.e., δ > 1/2), this inequality holds only if the
probability 1 − q of high productivity tomorrow is low enough; i.e., if the future looks
dim. When (1) holds, the principal finds it optimal to make a separating offer, since such
an offer gets the low cost type to work at time t = 0. In contrast, when (1) does not hold
the principal makes a low offer that both types reject.
Suppose next that b0 = bH . In this case, the assumption that µ < µ implies that it
is optimal for the principal to make a pooling offer T0 = cH that both types accept. In
particular, if the benefit is large with probability 1 (i.e., q = 0), the principal is never able
to learn the agent’s type.
There are three main takeaways from this example. First, productivity shocks may
enable the principal to learn the agent’s private information. Second, learning happens
when times are bad and the future looks dim. Third, there is path dependence: the value
that the principal derives in the second period depends on the first period shock.
In the rest of the paper, we consider an infinite horizon model in which both the
agent’s type and the principal’s benefit can take finitely many values. The three main
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takeaways of the two period model extend to this environment. But the infinite horizon
model gives rise to new results as well. First, the principal may learn the agent’s private
information gradually over time. Second, even when learning takes place, learning may
stop before the principal knows the agent’s type. And finally, the principal’s payoff may
display path dependence even in the long run, and even when the process governing the
evolution of productivity is ergodic.
3 Model
3.1 Setup
We study a repeated game played between a principal and an agent. Time is discrete and
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. At the start of each period t, a state bt is drawn from a finite
set of states B, and is publicly revealed. The evolution of bt is governed by a Markov
process with transition matrix [Qb,b′ ]b,b′∈B. After observing bt ∈ B, the principal decides
how much transfer Tt ≥ 0 to offer the agent in exchange for taking a productive action.
The agent then decides whether or not to take the action. We denote the agent’s choice
by at ∈ {0, 1}, where at = 1 means that the agent takes the action at period t. The action
provides the principal a benefit equal to bt.
The agent incurs a cost ac ≥ 0 when choosing action a ∈ {0, 1}. The agent’s cost c
of taking the action is his private information, and it is fixed throughout the game. Cost
c may take one of K possible values from the set C = {c1, ..., cK}. The principal’s prior
belief about the agent’s cost is denoted µ0 ∈ ∆(C), which we assume has full support. At
the end of each period the principal observes the agent’s action and updates her beliefs
about the agent’s cost. Players receive their payoffs and the game moves to the next
period.4 Both players are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers and share a common
discount factor δ < 1.5 The payoffs to the principal and an agent of cost c = ck at the
end of period t are, respectively,
u(bt, Tt, at) = (1− δ) (bt − Tt) at,
vk(bt, Tt, at) = (1− δ) (Tt − ck) at.
4As in Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993), the principal can commit to paying the transfer
within the current period, but cannot commit to a schedule of transfers in future periods.
5The results are qualitatively the same when the players have different discount factors.
7
We assume, without loss of generality, that the agent’s possible costs are ordered so
that 0 < c1 < c2 < ... < cK . To avoid having to deal with knife-edge cases, we further
assume that b 6= ck for all b ∈ B and ck ∈ C. Then, it is socially optimal for an agent with
cost ck to take action a = 1 at state b ∈ B if and only if b− ck > 0. Let the set of states
at which it is socially optimal for an agent with cost ck to take the action be
Ek := {b ∈ B : b > ck}.
We refer to Ek as the efficiency set for type ck. Note that by our assumptions on the
ordering of types, the efficiency sets are nested, i.e. Ek′ ⊆ Ek for all k′ ≥ k.
We assume that process {bt} is persistent and that players are moderately patient. To
formalize this, first define the following function: for any b ∈ B and B ⊆ B, let
X(b, B) := (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt1{bt∈B}|b0 = b
]
,
where E[·|b0 = b] denotes the expectation operator with respect to the Markov process
{bt}, given that the period 0 state is b. Thus X(b, B) is the expected discounted amount
of time that the realized state is in B in the future, given that the current state is b. For
any b ∈ B, let b+ := {b′ ∈ B : b′ ≥ b}. We maintain the following assumption throughout.
Assumption 1 (discounting/persistence) X(b, b+) > 1− δ for all b ∈ B.
When there are no shocks to productivity (i.e., when the state is fully persistent) this
assumption holds when δ > 1/2. In general, for any δ > 1/2, it holds whenever the
process {bt} is sufficiently persistent. When process {bt} is ergodic, there is a cutoff
δ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that the assumption holds whenever δ > δ.6
3.2 Histories, Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
A history ht = 〈(b0, T0, a0), ..., (bt−1, Tt−1, at−1)〉 records the states, transfers and agent’s
action from the beginning of the game until the start of period t. For any two histories
ht′ and ht with t
′ ≥ t, we write ht′  ht if the first t period entries of ht′ are the same as
the t period entries of ht. Let Ht denote the set of histories of length t and H =
⋃
t≥0Ht
6When there are no shocks, Assumption 1 (i.e., δ > 1/2) guarantees that there will be no learning by
the principal in equilibrium – see Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993). If this assumption fails,
then there will be learning.
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the set of all histories. A pure strategy for the principal is a function τ : H × B → R+,
which maps histories and the current state to transfer offers T . A pure strategy for the
agent is a collection of mappings {αk}Kk=1, αk : H ×B×R+ → {0, 1}, each of which maps
the current history, current state and current transfer offer to the action choice a ∈ {0, 1}
for a particular type ck.
For conciseness, we restrict attention to pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) in the body of the paper. We consider mixed strategies in Online Appendix OA2;
see also Remark 2 below. Pure strategy PBE are denoted by the pair (σ, µ), where
σ = (τ, {αk}Kk=1) is a strategy profile and µ : H → ∆(C) gives the principal’s beliefs about
the agent’s type after each history. For any PBE (σ, µ), the continuation payoffs of the
principal and an agent with cost ck after history h ∈ H and shock realization b ∈ B are
denoted U (σ,µ)[h, b] and V
(σ,µ)
k [h, b]. For any µ0 ∈ ∆(C), any PBE (σ, µ) and any shock
b ∈ B, we denote by W (σ,µ)[µ0, b] the principal’s payoff at the start of a game with prior
µ0 under the PBE (σ, µ) when the initial shock is b.
We restrict attention to pure strategy PBE that satisfy a sequential optimality con-
dition for the principal, defined as follows. For each integer n ≤ |C| = K, define
Sn := {λ ∈ ∆(C) : |suppλ| = n}. Let Σ0 denote the set of pure strategy PBE. For
all k = 1, 2, ..., K, we define the sets Σk recursively as follows:
Σk :=
{
(σ, µ) ∈ Σk−1 : ∀(h, b) with µ[h] ∈ Sk and ∀(σ
′, µ′) ∈ Σk−1,
U (σ,µ)[h, b] ≥ W (σ′,µ′)[µ[h], b]
}
.
Thus, Σ1 is the set of pure strategy PBE that deliver the highest possible payoff to the
principal at histories at which her beliefs are degenerate. For all k > 1, Σk is the set of
pure strategy PBE in Σk−1 that deliver the highest possible payoff to the principal (among
all PBE in Σk−1) at histories at which the support of her beliefs contains k elements.7 In
what follows, we restrict attention to PBE in ΣK (recall that |C| = K) and use the word
equilibrium to refer to such a PBE.8
At any PBE satisfying the refinement, the principal extracts the maximum possible
surplus from the agent at histories at which she has learned the agent’s type; i.e., the
continuation PBE is “principal-optimal” at such histories. At histories at which the prin-
cipal believes that the agent may be one of two possible types, players play a continuation
7We highlight that, for a given belief µ[h] and state b ∈ B, we consider only (σ′, µ′) ∈ Σk−1 such that
(σ′, µ′) is a PBE of a game in which the principal’s prior belief is µ[h] and the initial state is b.
8Our solution concept is similar in spirit to the “ratchet equilibrium” concept used by Gerardi and
Maestri (2015).
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PBE that is optimal for the principal among the set of PBE that are principal-optimal at
histories after which the principal has learned the agent’s type. We proceed like this to con-
struct restrictions on PBE for continuation games in which the support of the principal’s
beliefs contain three types; etc. By forcing continuation play to be constrained-optimal
for the principal at all histories (either on or off the path of play), this solution concept
naturally captures lack of commitment by the principal.9
We end this section by noting that our equilibrium refinement facilitates a direct com-
parison with prior papers on the ratchet effect, e.g. Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt
(1993). As we show below, this refinement selects a unique equilibrium that naturally
generalizes the equilibrium studied in these papers. In particular, when there are no
productivity shocks (i.e., when B is a singleton), our equilibrium coincides with the equi-
librium in Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993).
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Incentive Constraints
Fix an equilibrium (σ, µ) =
(
(τ, {αk}Kk=1), µ
)
. Recall that for any h ∈ H, µ[h] are the
principal’s beliefs at history h. We use C[h] ⊂ C to denote the support of µ[h], and
k[h] := max{k : ck ∈ C[h]} to denote the highest type index in C[h]. Since c1 < ... < cK ,
ck[h] is the highest cost in the support of µ[h]. Finally, for all ck ∈ C, we let at,k be the
random variable indicating the action in {0, 1} that an agent of type ck takes in period t
under equilibrium (σ, µ).
For any history h, any pair ci, cj ∈ C[h], and any productivity level b ∈ B, let
V
(σ,µ)
i→j [h, b] := (1− δ)E(σ,µ)
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−tat′,j(Tt′ − ci)|ht = h, bt = b
]
be the expected discounted payoff that an agent with cost ci obtains at time t after history
ht = h when bt = b from following the equilibrium strategy of an agent with cost cj. Here,
E(σ,µ)[·|h, b] denotes the expectation over future play under equilibrium (σ, µ) conditional
on history h and current shock b. Note that for any ci ∈ C[h], the continuation value of
9The solution concept can also be interpreted as capturing renegotiation-proofness in a setting where
the principal has all of the bargaining power. Consider a PBE in ΣK . At histories at which the principal’s
beliefs contain k elements, she has no incentive to renegotiate the equilibrium to another equilibrium in
Σk−1, since the players will play a (constrained) principal-optimal continuation equilibrium.
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an agent with cost ci at history h and current shock b is simply V
(σ,µ)
i [h, b] := V
(σ,µ)
i→i [h, b].
Also note that
V
(σ,µ)
i→j [h, b] = (1− δ)E(σ,µ)
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−t (at′,j(Tt′ − cj) + at′,j(cj − ci)) |ht = h, bt = b
]
= V
(σ,µ)
j [h, b] + (cj − ci)Aσj [h, b] (2)
where V
(σ,µ)
j [h, b] is type cj’s continuation value at (h, b) and
A
(σ,µ)
j [h, b] := (1− δ)E(σ,µ)
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−tat′,j|ht = h, bt = b
]
is the expected discounted number of times that type cj takes the productive action
after history (h, b) under equilibrium (σ, µ). Equation (2) says that type ci’s payoff from
deviating to cj’s strategy can be decomposed into two parts: type cj’s continuation value,
and an informational rent (cj − ci)A(σ,µ)j [h, b], which depends on how frequently cj is
expected to take the action in the future. In any equilibrium (µ, σ),
V
(σ,µ)
i [h, b] ≥ V (σ,µ)i→j [h, b] ∀(h, b),∀ci, cj ∈ C[h] (3)
which represents the set of incentive constraints that must be satisfied. We then have
the following lemma, which we prove in the Online Appendix. Part (i) says that, in
any equilibrium, the highest cost type in the support of the principal’s beliefs obtains a
continuation payoff equal to zero. Part (ii) says that “local” incentive constraints bind.
Lemma 0. Fix an equilibrium (σ, µ) and a history h, and if necessary renumber the types
so that C[h] = {c1, c2, ..., ck[h]} with c1 < c2 < ... < ck[h]. Then, for all b ∈ B,
(i) V
(σ,µ)
k[h]
[h, b] = 0.
(ii) If |C[h]| ≥ 2, V (σ,µ)i [h, b] = V (σ,µ)i→i+1[h, b] for all ci ∈ C[h]\{ck[h]}.
The proof of Lemma 0 is in Online Appendix OA1. The result follows from our solution
concept: in any PBE satisfying our restrictions, the principal will extract all surplus from
an agent that has the highest possible cost. Similarly, the principal will extract all possible
surplus (subject to IC constraints) from agents with lower costs.
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4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We now describe the (essentially) unique equilibrium in ΣK . Recall that ck[h] is the highest
cost in the support of the principal’s beliefs at history h, and Ek is the set of productivity
levels at which it is socially optimal for type ck ∈ C to take the action.
Theorem 1. The set of equilibria is non-empty. In any equilibrium (σ, µ), for every
history (h, b) ∈ H × B:
(i) If b ∈ Ek[h], the principal offers transfer T = ck[h] and all types in C[h] take action
a = 1.
(ii) If b /∈ Ek[ht], there is a threshold type ck∗ ∈ C[h] such that types in C− := {ck ∈
C[h] : ck < ck∗} take action a = 1, while types in C+ := {ck ∈ C[h] : ck ≥ ck∗} take
action a = 0. If C− is non-empty, the transfer that the principal offers (and which
is accepted by types in C−) satisfies
T = cj∗ +
1
1− δV
(σ,µ)
j∗→k∗ [h, b], (∗)
where cj∗ = maxC
−. If X(b, Ek[h]) > 1− δ, set C− is empty.
Theorem 1 says that at histories (h, b) such that either b ∈ Ek[h] or b /∈ Ek[h] and
X(b, Ek[h]) > 1− δ, all the agent types in C[h] take the same action. Hence, the principal
learns nothing about the agent’s type at such histories. To understand why, note that
at such histories (h, b) players expect the state to be in Ek[h] frequently in the future –
formally, X(b, Ek[h]) > 1− δ.10 Therefore, an agent with cost ci < ck[h] gets large rents by
mimicking an agent with cost ck[h]. Since low cost types anticipate that the principal will
leave them with no future rents if they reveal their private information, the principal is
unable to learn.
Equilibrium behavior is, however, quite different at histories (h, b) with b ∈ Ek[ht]
compared to histories (h, b) with b /∈ Ek[h] and X(b, Ek[h]) > 1− δ. When b ∈ Ek[h], there
is an efficient ratchet effect. At these productivity levels the agent takes the socially
efficient action a = 1, and the principal compensates him as if he was the highest cost
type. This replicates the main finding of the ratchet effect literature. For example, Hart
and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993) consider a special case of our model in which the
benefit from taking the action is constant over time and strictly larger than the highest
10For histories (h, b) with b ∈ Ek[ht], this inequality follows from Assumption 1.
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cost (i.e., for all times t, bt = b > cK). Thus, part (i) of Theorem 1 applies: the principal
offers a transfer T = cK that all agent types accept at all periods, and she never learns
anything about the agent’s type.11
At histories (h, b) with b /∈ Ek[h] and X(b, Ek[h]) > 1 − δ, there is an inefficient
ratchet effect. At these histories, low cost types pool with high cost types and don’t
take the productive action even if the principal is willing to fully compensate their costs.
This contrasts with the results in Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993), where the
equilibrium is always socially optimal.
Lastly, at histories (h, b) with b /∈ Ek[h] and X(b, Ek[h]) ≤ 1 − δ, learning may take
place. Specifically, the principal learns about the agent’s type when a subset of the types
take the action (i.e., when the set C− is nonempty). Intuitively, the informational rent
that type ci < ck[h] gets from mimicking an agent with the highest cost ck[h] are small
when X(b, Ek[h]) ≤ 1 − δ. As a result, the principal is able to get low cost types to
reveal their private information. In Appendix A.1.3 we provide a characterization of the
threshold cost ck∗ in part (ii) of the theorem as the solution to a finite maximization
problem. Building on this, we also characterize the principal’s equilibrium payoffs as the
fixed point of a contraction mapping.
Remark 1. (Markovian equilibrium) Note that the equilibrium characterized in The-
orem 1 is Markovian: at each period, the behavior of principal and agent depends solely
on the principal’s beliefs and the current shock realization.
Remark 2. (mixed strategies) In the Online Appendix OA2, we extend our analysis
and consider a broad class of mixed strategy PBE. In particular, we look at the class of
finitely revealing PBE (Peski, 2008); i.e., PBE in which, along any history, the principal’s
beliefs are updated only finitely many times.
Let ΣM0 denote the set of PBE that are finitely revealing. For k = 1, ..., K, define the
sets ΣMk recursively as follows:
ΣMk :=
{
(σ, µ) ∈ ΣMk−1 :
∀(h, b) with µ[h] ∈ Sk and ∀(σ′, µ′) ∈ ΣMk−1
U (σ,µ)[h, b] ≥ W (σ′,µ′)[µ[h], b]
}
.
This is the natural generalization of our equilibrium refinement to mixed strategies under
which the principal updates her beliefs a bounded number of times at every history.
11Hart and Tirole (1988) and Schmidt (1993) consider games with a finite deadline. In such games,
the principal is only able to induce information revelation at the very last periods prior to the deadline.
As the deadline grows to infinity, there is no learning by the principal along the equilibrium path.
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Let (σP , µP ) denote the PBE in Theorem 1. We show in Appendix OA2 that (σP , µP ) ∈
ΣMK . This implies that any equilibrium in Σ
M
K must give the principal the same payoff
as (σP , µP ) at every history. Moreover, we show along the way that generically any
equilibrium in the set ΣMK is outcome-equivalent to (σ
P , µP ).
Remark 3. (full-commitment benchmark) We can compare the principal’s equilib-
rium profits to what she would obtain if she had full commitment. A principal with
commitment power will in general want to make a high-cost agent take action a = 1
inefficiently few times, to reduce the informational rents of low cost types. Time-varying
shocks enable the principal to approximate the full-commitment solution. At histories
(h, b) with b /∈ Ek[h] and X(b, Ek[h]) ≤ 1− δ, the principal can truthfully commit to con-
tract infrequently with the highest cost agent ck[h] in the future. This reduces the rents
for lower cost types, and enables the principal to learn about the agent’s type.
In Online Appendix OA3, we illustrate this for the case of two types, C = {c1, c2}.
We show that if X(b, E2) =  ≤ 1 − δ for some productivity level b ∈ E1\E2, then the
principal’s equilibrium payoff at histories (h, b) with C[h] = C are within (1−µ)(c2− c1)
of her full commitment payoff, where µ ∈ (0, 1) is the prior probability that c = c2.
4.3 Examples
We end this section with two examples that illustrate some of the main equilibrium
features of our model. The first highlights the fact that the equilibrium outcome can be
inefficient. The second illustrates a situation in which the principal learns the agent’s
type, and the equilibrium outcome is efficient.
Example 1. (inefficient ratchet effect) Suppose that there are two states, B =
{bL, bH}, and two types, C = {c1, c2} with c1 < bL < c2 < bH , so that E1 = {bL, bH}
and E2 = {bH}. Assume further that X(bL, {bH}) > 1− δ.
Consider a history ht such that C[ht] = {c1, c2}. Theorem 1(i) implies that, at such
a history, both types take the action if bt = bH , receiving a transfer equal to c2. On the
other hand, Theorem 1(ii) implies that neither type takes the action if bt = bL. Indeed,
when X(bL, {bH}) > 1− δ the benefit that a c1-agent obtains by pooling with a c2-agent
is so large that there does not exist an offer that a c1-agent would accept but a c2-agent
would reject. As a result, the principal never learns the agent’s type. Inefficiencies arise
in all periods t in which bt = bL: an agent with cost c1 never takes the action when the
state is bL, even though it is socially optimal for him to do so.
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Example 2. (efficiency and learning) The environment is the same as in Example
2, with the only difference that X(bL, {bH}) < 1 − δ. Consider a history ht such that
C[ht] = {c1, c2}. As in Example 1, both types take the action in period t if bt = bH . The
difference is that, if bt = bL, the principal offers a transfer Tt that a c2-agent rejects, but
a c1-agent accepts. The principal’s offer Tt exactly compensates type c1 for revealing his
type: (1 − δ)(Tt − c1) = X(bL, {bH})(c2 − c1).12 Note that X(bL, {bH}) < 1 − δ implies
that Tt < c2, so an agent with cost c2 rejects offer Tt. The principal finds it optimal to
make such an offer, since it gets an agent with cost cL < bL to take the efficient action.
We note that the principal learns the agent’s type at time t = min{t : bt = bL}, and
the outcome is efficient from time t+ 1 onwards: type ci takes the action at time t
′ > t if
and only if bt′ ∈ Ei. Moreover, Lemma 0(i) guarantees that the principal extracts all of
the surplus from time t+ 1 onwards, paying the agent a transfer equal to his cost.
The inefficiency in Example 1 contrasts with the results of the ratchet effect literature
in which the outcome is always efficient. The results of Example 2 contrast with this
literature as well, in which the principal finds it difficult to learn. The key features of this
example are that (i) learning by the principal takes place only if productivity is low, (ii)
the principal eventually achieves her first best payoff, and (iii) the equilibrium exhibits
a form of path-dependence: equilibrium play at time t depends on the entire history of
shocks up to period t.13 These features motivate the results of the next section.
5 Implications
5.1 The Consequences of Bad Shocks
In Example 2 above, the principal learns the agent’s type and learning takes place the
first time the relationship hits the low productivity state. In addition, as soon as the low
productivity state is reached for the first time, the agent’s compensation falls permanently.
In this section, we present conditions under which these results generalize.
Consider the following assumption, which is a monotonicity condition on the stochastic
process Q that governs the evolution of productivity.
12The payoff a low cost agent obtains by accepting offer Tt is (1− δ)(Tt − c1) + δ0, since the principal
learns that the agent’s cost is c1. On the other hand, the payoff such an agent obtains from rejecting the
offer and mimicking a high cost agent is X(bL, {bH})(c2 − c1).
13Before state bL is reached for the first time, the principal pays a transfer equal to the agent’s highest
cost c2 to get both types to take the action. After state bL is visited, if the principal finds that the agent
has low cost, then she pays a lower transfer equal to c1.
15
Assumption 2 For all ck ∈ C, X(b, Ek) ≤ X(b′, Ek) for all b, b′ ∈ B with b < b′.
The assumption is natural; for example, it holds when transition matrix {Qb,b˜}b˜∈B satisfies
the monotone likelihood ratio property.14
Now refer to history (ht, bt) as a history of information revelation if µ[ht+1] 6= µ[ht];
i.e., if learning takes place at history (ht, bt). The following proposition states that under
Assumption 2, learning takes place only in periods of low productivity.
Proposition 1. (learning in bad times) Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. For every
history ht there exists a productivity level b[ht] ∈ B such that (ht, bt) is a history of
information revelation only if bt < b[ht].
Proof. By Theorem 1, µ[ht+1] 6= µ[ht] only if (ht, bt) are such that X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1−δ. By
Assumption 2, there exists b[ht] such thatX(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1−δ if and only if bt < b[ht].15
To see why the result holds, note that under Assumption 2 the future expected dis-
counted surplus of the relationship is increasing in the current shock bt. This implies that
the informational rent that agents with type ci < ck[ht] get from mimicking an agent with
the highest cost ck[ht] is also increasing in bt. As a result, the principal is only able to
learn about the agent’s type in periods where the productivity bt is low.
Next, recall that according to Theorem 1, if (ht, bt) is a history of information revela-
tion, then there exists a type cj∗ ∈ C[ht] such that only agents with cost at most cj∗ take
action the action at time t. We refer to type cj∗ the marginal type in period t. Also, for
every history (ht, bt) and every type cj ∈ C[ht], define
Pj[ht, bt] := −(1− δ)E(σ,µ)
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−t|1bt′∈Ej − at′,j|(bt′ − cj)
∣∣∣ht, bt]
which is a measure of how efficient the equilibrium actions of type cj are. The fol-
lowing proposition, which follows directly from Theorem 1, states two results: (i) that
productivity increases after histories of information revelation, and (ii) that the agent’s
compensation may fall permanently after such histories.
Proposition 2. (productivity and compensation) Let (ht, bt) be a history of infor-
mation revelation, and cj∗ the marginal type at time t. Then, for all (hτ , bτ ) with hτ  ht,
14That is, for every b > b′,
Qb,b˜
Qb′,b˜
= prob(bt+1=b˜|bt=b)
prob(bt+1=b˜|bt=b′) is increasing in b˜.
15When b[ht] = minB, X(b, Ek) > 1 − δ for all b ∈ B. In this case, the principal’s beliefs remain
unchanged after history ht.
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(i) Pj∗ [hτ , bτ ] = 0, and
(ii) V
(σ,µ)
j∗ [hτ , bτ ] = 0.
Part (i) of this result, combined with Proposition 1, implies that agents’ productivity
will increase after the relationship goes through bad times. The result is in line with Lazear
et al. (2016), who find evidence that workers’ productivity increases after a recession.
Part (ii) combined with Proposition 1 implies that the agents’ compensation may be
permanently lowered after the relationship experiences negative shocks. This finding is
consistent with Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012), who provide evidence that
recessions have a persistent negative effect on worker compensation.
We end this section by briefly discussing the robustness of these predictions to settings
in which both the firm’s productivity and the worker’s outside option are time-varying
and publicly observed. In such a setting, learning will typically take place at periods
in which net productivity (i.e., productivity minus outside option) is low. Therefore,
our predictions relating recessions to the agent’s performance and compensation would
continue to hold as long as recessions negatively effect the firm’s net productivity.
5.2 Long-Run First-Best Payoffs
Another notable feature of Example 2 is that full learning takes place, and as a result,
the principal’s value increases permanently to the first best level. Here, we characterize
general conditions under which the principal obtains her first-best payoff in the long-run,
as well as conditions under which she doesn’t. Before stating our results, we introduce
some additional notation and make a preliminary observation.
An equilibrium outcome can be written as an infinite sequence h∞ = 〈bt, Tt, at〉∞t=0, or
equivalently as an infinite sequence of equilibrium histories h∞ = {ht}∞t=0 such that ht+1 
ht for all t. For any equilibrium outcome h∞, there exists a time t∗[h∞] such that µ[ht] =
µ[ht∗[h∞]] for all ht  ht∗[h∞]. That is, given an equilibrium outcome, learning always stops
after some time t∗[h∞]. Given an equilibrium outcome h∞, in every period after t∗[h∞]
the principal’s continuation payoff depends only on the realization of the current period
shock. Formally, given any equilibrium outcome h∞ = {ht}∞t=0, the principal’s equilibrium
continuation value at time t ≥ t∗[h∞] can be written as U (σ,µ)LR (bt|ht∗[h∞]).
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For all b ∈ B and all ck ∈ C, the principal’s first best payoffs conditional on the current
shock being b and the agent’s type being c = ck are given by
U∗(b|ck) := (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−t(bt′ − ck)1{bt′∈Ek}
∣∣∣ bt = b] .
Under the first best outcome the agent takes the action whenever it is socially optimal
and the principal always compensates the agent his exact cost. Say that an equilibrium
(σ, µ) is long run first best if for all ck ∈ C, the set of equilibrium outcomes h∞ such that
U
(σ,µ)
LR (b|ht∗[h∞]) = U∗(b|ck) ∀t > t∗[h∞] and ∀b ∈ B,
has probability 1 when the agent’s type is c = ck. The next result, which we prove in
Appendix A.2, reports a sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be long run first best.
Proposition 3. (long run first best) Suppose that {bt} is ergodic and that for all
ck ∈ C\{cK} there exists a productivity level b ∈ Ek\Ek+1 such that X(b, Ek+1) < 1 − δ.
Then, the equilibrium is long run first best.
The condition in the statement of Proposition 3 guarantees that, for any history h such
that |C[h]| ≥ 2, there exists at least one state b ∈ B at which the principal finds it optimal
to make an offer that only a strict subset of types accept. So if the process {bt} is ergodic,
then it is certain that the principal will eventually learn the agent’s type, and from that
point onwards she gets her first best payoffs.
If an equilibrium is long run first best then it is also long run efficient, i.e. for all
ck ∈ C, with probability one an agent with cost ck takes the action at time t > t∗[h∞]
if and only if bt ∈ Ek. However, the converse of this statement is not true. Because of
this, there are weaker sufficient conditions under which long run efficiency holds. One
such condition is that {bt} is ergodic and for all ck ∈ C such that Ek 6= EK , there exists
b ∈ Ek\Ek such that X(b, Ek) < 1− δ, where k = min{j ≥ k : Ej 6= Ek}. This condition
guarantees that the principal’s beliefs will eventually place all the mass on the set of types
that share the same efficiency set with the agent’s true type. After this happens, even if
the principal does not achieve her first best payoff by further learning the agent’s type,
the agent takes the action if and only if it is socially optimal to do so. The argument
mirrors that of Proposition 3.
Our next result provides a partial counterpart to Proposition 3. The result is an
immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
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Proposition 4. (no long run first best; no long run efficiency) Let h be an equi-
librium history such that |C[h]| ≥ 2 and suppose that X(b, Ek[h]) > 1 − δ for all b ∈ B.
Then µ[h′] = µ[h] for all histories h′  h (and thus |C[h′]| ≥ 2), so the equilibrium is not
long run first best. If, in addition, there exists ci ∈ C[h] such that Ei 6= Ek[h], then the
equilibrium is not long run efficient either.
5.3 Long-Run Path Dependence
The third notable feature of Example 2 was that the equilibrium exhibits a form of path-
dependence: equilibrium play at time t depends on the entire history of shocks up to period
t. Note, however, that the path dependence in Example 2 is short-lived: after state bL is
visited for the first time, the principal learns the agent’s type and the equilibrium outcome
from that point onwards is independent of the prior history of shocks. Here we show that
this is not a general property of our model.
Say that an equilibrium (σ, µ) exhibits long run path dependence if for some type of the
agent ck ∈ C there exists U1 : B → R and U2 : B → R, U1 6= U2, such that conditional on
the agent’s type being ck, the set of outcomes h∞ with U
(σ,µ)
LR (·|ht∗[h∞]) = Ui(·) has positive
probability for i = 1, 2. That is, the equilibrium exhibits long run path dependence if,
with positive probability, the principal’s long run payoffs may take more than one value
conditional on the agent’s type.
The next example shows that equilibrium may exhibit long-run path dependence when
process {bt} is not ergodic.
Example 3. (path dependence with non-ergodic shocks) Let C = {c1, c2}, and B =
{bL, bM , bH}, with bL < bM < bH . Suppose that E1 = {bL, bM , bH} and E2 = {bM , bH}.
Suppose further that the transition matrix [Qb,b′ ] satisfies: (i) X(bL, E2) < 1− δ, and (ii)
QbH ,bH = 1 and Qb,b′ ∈ (0, 1) for all (b, b′) with b 6= bH . Thus, state bH is absorbing. By
Theorem 1, if bt = bH , from time t onwards the principal makes an offer equal to ck[ht]
and all agent types in C[ht] accept.
Consider history ht with C[ht] = {c1, c2}. By Theorem 1, if bt = bM the principal
makes an offer Tt = c2 that both types of agents accept. If bt = bL, the principal makes
offer T˜ = c1 +
1
1−δX(bL, E2)(c2 − c1) ∈ (c1, c2) that type c1 accepts and type c2 rejects.
Therefore, the principal learns the agent’s type.
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Now suppose that the agent’s true type is c = c1, and consider the following two
histories, ht and h˜t:
ht = 〈(bt′ = bM , Tt′ = c2, at′ = 1)t−1t′=1〉,
h˜t = 〈(bt′ = bM , Tt′ = c2, at′ = 1)t−2t′=1, (bt−1 = bL, Tt−1 = T˜ , at−1 = 1)〉.
Under history ht, bt′ = bM for all t
′ ≤ t − 1, so the principal’s beliefs after ht is realized
are equal to her prior. Under history h˜t the principal learns that the agent’s type is c1 at
time t − 1. Suppose that bt = bH , so that bt′ = bH for all t′ ≥ t. Under history ht, the
principal doesn’t know the agent’s type at t, and therefore offers a transfer Tt′ = c2 for all
t′ ≥ t, which both agent types accept. However, under history h˜t the principal knows that
the agent’s type is c1, and therefore offers transfer Tt′ = c1 for all t
′ ≥ t, and the agent
accepts it. Therefore, when the agent’s type is c1, the principal’s continuation payoff at
history (ht, bt = bH) is bH − c2, while her payoff at history (h˜t, bt = bH) is bH − c1.
Path-dependence in this example is driven by the non-ergodicity of the productivity
shocks. Since bH > c2 is absorbing, Theorem 1 implies that the principal will stop learning
once the shock reaches this state. At the same time, the principal is able to screen the
different types when the shock reaches state bL (since X(bL, E2) < 1− δ), but is unable to
screen them at state bM . Therefore, the principal only learns the agent’s type at histories
such that shock bL is realized before shock bH .
We highlight, however, that the model may give rise to path-dependence even when
the evolution of productivity is governed by an ergodic process. The following example,
which is fully developed in Online Appendix OA4, illustrates this.
Example 4. (path dependence with ergodic shocks) Let C = {c1, c2, c3} and B =
{bL, bML, bMH , bH}, bL < bML < bMH < bH . Suppose that E1 = E2 = {bML, bMH , bH} and
E3 = {bH}. Suppose further that the transition matrix [Qb,b′ ] satisfies: (a) Qb,b′ > 0 for
all b, b′ ∈ B, and (b) X(bMH , {bH}) > 1− δ, and X(b, {bH}) < 1− δ for b = bL, bML.
In Online Appendix OA4 we show that, under additional conditions, the unique equi-
librium has the following properties:
(i) For histories ht such that C[ht] = {c1, c2}, µ[ht′ ] = µ[ht] for all ht′  ht (i.e., there
is no more learning by the principal from time t onwards);
(ii) For histories ht such that C[ht] = {c2, c3}: if bt = bL or bt = bMH , types c2 and c3
take action a = 0; if bt = bML, type c2 takes action a = 1 and type c3 takes action
a = 0; and if bt = bH , types c2 and c3 take action a = 1;
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(iii) For histories ht such that C[ht] = {c1, c2, c3}: if bt = bL, type c1 takes action a = 1
while types c2 and c3 take action a = 0; if bt = bML, types c1 and c2 take action
a = 1 and type c3 takes action a = 0; if bt = bMH , all agent types take action a = 0;
and if bt = bH , all agent types take action a = 1.
An immediate consequence of these facts is that when the agent’s type is c1, the principal
learns the agent’s type at histories such that state bL is visited before bML. In contrast,
at histories at which bML is visited before bL, the principal only learns that the agent’s
type is in {c1, c2}. From this point onwards, her beliefs are never again updated. As a
result, the principal’s long run value when the agent’s type is c1 depends on whether or
not shock bL is realized before shock bML.
To understand Example 4, note that the informational rents that type c1 gets by mimicking
type c2 depend on how often c2 is expected to take the productive action in the future.
In turn, how often c2 takes the productive action depends on the principal’s beliefs. If
the principal learns along the path of play that the agent’s type is not c3, from that time
onwards type c2 will take the action whenever the state is in E2 = {bML, bMH , bH}.
In contrast, at histories at which the principal has not ruled out types c2 and c3,
type c2 will not take the productive action at time t if bt = bMH (since, by assumption,
X(bMH , E3) > 1 − δ). Therefore, type c2 is expected to take the action significantly less
frequently in the future at a history after which the support of the principal’s beliefs is
{c1, c2, c3} than at a history at which it is {c1, c2}.
As a consequence of this, the cost of getting a c1-agent to reveal his private information
depends on the principal’s beliefs. In particular, when the current productivity level is
bL, getting a c1-agent to reveal his private information is cheaper at histories where all
three types are in the support of the principal’s beliefs than at histories at which only
c1 and c2 are in the support. This difference makes it optimal for the principal to get
a c1-agent to reveal his type when productivity is bL and the support of the principal’s
beliefs is {c1, c2, c3}, and at the same time it makes it suboptimal to get this agent type
to reveal himself when productivity is bL and the support is {c1, c2}.
6 Final Remarks
Productivity shocks are a natural feature of most economic environments, and the incen-
tives that economic agents face in completely stationary environments can be very dif-
ferent than the incentives they face in environments subject to these shocks. Our results
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demonstrate this for the traditional ratchet effect literature. A key takeaway from this
literature is that outside institutions that provide contract enforcement can help improve
the principal’s welfare. However, our results show that even without such institutions, a
strategic principal can use productivity shocks to her advantage to progressively learn the
agent’s private information and improve her own welfare.
Our model has several natural extensions. For example, we have assumed that the
benefit b that the principal obtains when the agent takes the action is publicly observed.
This assumption is natural in settings in which the principal’s benefit depends on the cost
of some key input (like oil or cement), or when this benefit is linked to the aggregate state
of the economy. However, it is also interesting to consider settings in which benefit b is
privately observed by the principal.
For concreteness, consider the setting of Examples 1 and 2, in which b can take values
{bL, bH} and the agent’s cost can take values {c1, c2}, with bH > c2 > bL > c1 (i.e.,
E1 = {bL, bH} and E2 = {bH}). Assume first that X(b, E2) > 1 − δ for b = bL, bH . In
this case, the equilibrium outcome in Theorem 1 remains an equilibrium even when {bt}
is privately observed: under this condition a low cost agent is not willing to disclose his
private information regardless of whether or not he observes the shock realization.
In constrast, if X(bL, E2) < 1−δ, the equilibrium outcome in Theorem 1 fails to be an
equilibrium when shocks are privately observed by the principal. In this case, when the
benefit is bH the principal would prefer to make an offer as if the benefit were bL, to induce
the low cost agent to reveal his private information. In this setting, one can construct
PBE under which the principal’s transfer offer perfectly reveals her private information
at each point (i.e., her transfer Tt reveals the realization of benefit bt at every period t).
In such equilibria, at histories (h, b) with b = bH and C[h] = {c1, c2} the principal makes
a high offer T = c2 that both types accept with probability 1. At histories (h, b) with
b = bL and C[h] = {c1, c2} the principal makes a low offer T ∈ (c1, c2) that leaves low
cost agents indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Such an offer is rejected by high
cost agents, and accepted with probability α ∈ [0, 1] by low cost agents. The probability
of acceptance α is calibrated to provide incentives to the principal to make a high offer
T = c2 at histories (h, b) with b = bH and C[h] = {c1, c2}.16
16Further details about such equilibria are available from the authors upon request.
22
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds in three steps. First we analyze the case where bt ∈ Ek[ht], establishing
part (i) of the theorem. Then we analyze the case where bt /∈ Ek[ht], establishing part
(ii). Finally, we show that equilibrium exists and has unique payoffs. In doing so, we also
characterize the threshold type ck∗ defined in part (ii).
A.1.1 Proof of part (i) (the case of bt ∈ Ek[ht])
We prove part (i) by strong induction on the cardinality of C[ht]. If C[ht] is a singleton
{ck}, the result holds: in any PBE in ΣK , the principal offers the agent a transfer Tt′ = ck
at all times t′ ≥ t such that bt′ ∈ Ek and the agent accepts, and she offers some transfer
Tt′ < ck at all times t
′ ≥ t such that bt′ /∈ Ek, and the agent rejects.
Suppose next that the claim is true for all histories ht′ such that |C[ht′ ]| ≤ n− 1. Let
(ht, bt) be a history such that |C[ht]| = n and bt ∈ Ek[ht]. We show that, at such a history
(ht, bt) the principal makes an offer Tt = ck[ht] that all agent types accept.
Note first that in a PBE in ΣK , it cannot be that at (ht, bt) the principal makes an
offer that no type in C[ht] accepts. To see this, suppose by contradiction that this were
possible. Then consider an alternative PBE which is identical to the original PBE, except
that at history (ht, bt) the principal makes an offer T = ck[ht], and all agent types in C[ht]
accept any offer weakly larger than T = ck[ht]. The principal’s beliefs after this period
are equal to µ[ht] regardless of the agent’s action. Since T = ck[ht], it is optimal for all
agent types to accept this offer. Moreover, it is optimal for the principal to make offer
T . Finally, since bt ∈ Ek[ht], the payoff that the principal gets from this PBE is larger
than her payoff under the original PBE. But this cannot be, since the original PBE is in
ΣK . Hence, if bt ∈ Ek[ht], at least a subset of types in C[ht] take the action at time t if
bt ∈ Ek[ht].
We now show that, in a PBE in ΣK , it cannot be that at (ht, bt) the principal makes
an offer Tt that only a strict subset C ( C[ht] of types accept. Towards a contradiction,
suppose that a strict subset C ( C[ht] of types accept Tt, and let cj = maxC. There are
two possible cases: (a) cj = ck[ht], and (b) cj < ck[ht]. Consider case (a). By Lemma 0, the
continuation payoff of an agent with cost ck[ht] is zero at all histories. This implies that
Tt = ck[ht]. Let ci = maxC[ht]\C (note that C[ht]\C is non-empty by assumption). Since
ci rejects the offer today and becomes the highest cost in the support of the principal’s
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beliefs tomorrow, Lemma 0 implies that V
(σ,µ)
i [ht, bt] = 0. But this cannot be, since this
agent can guarantee a payoff of at least (1−δ)(Tt−ci) = (1−δ)(ck[ht]−ci) > 0 by accepting
the offer. Hence, if only a strict subset C ( C[ht] of types accept, cj = maxC < ck[ht].
Consider next case (b). By Lemma 0, the payoff of type cj from taking the productive
action at time t is (1− δ)(Tt− cj) + 0. Indeed, at period t+ 1, cj will be the highest cost
in the support of the principal’s beliefs if he takes the action at t. Since an agent with
cost cj can mimic the strategy of type ck[ht], incentive compatibility implies that
(1− δ)(Tt − cj) ≥ V (σ,µ)k[ht] [ht, bt] + (ck[ht] − cj)A
(σ,µ)
k[ht]
[ht, bt]
≥ (ck[ht] − cj)X(bt, Ek[ht]) > (1− δ)(ck[ht] − cj) (4)
The first inequality follows from equation (3) in the main text. The second inequality
follows from Lemma 0 and the fact that A
(σ,µ)
k[ht]
[ht, bt] ≥ X(bt, Ek[ht]). To see why this
last inequality holds, note that ck[ht] /∈ C, so at most n − 1 types accept the principal’s
offer. Thus, the inductive hypothesis implies that if the agent rejects the offer, then at all
periods t′ > t the principal will get all the remaining types to take the action whenever
bt ∈ Ek[ht], and so A(σ,µ)k[ht] [ht, bt] ≥ X(bt, Ek[ht]). The last inequality in equation (4) follows
from the fact X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≥ X(bt, b+t ) > 1 − δ where the first inequality holds because
bt ∈ Ek[ht] and the second follows by Assumption 1.
On the other hand, because Lemma 0 implies that an agent with type ck[ht] has a
continuation value of zero, the transfer Tt that the principal offers must be weakly smaller
than ck[ht]; otherwise, if Tt > ck[ht], an agent with type ck[ht] could guarantee himself a
strictly positive payoff by accepting the offer. But this contradicts (4). Hence, it cannot
be that only a strict subset of types in C[ht] accept the principal’s offer at (ht, bt).
By the arguments above, all agents in C[ht] take action a = 1 at (ht, bt) with bt ∈ Ek[ht].
Since an agent with cost ck[ht] obtains a payoff of zero after every history (Lemma 0), the
transfer that the principal offers at time t is Tt = ck[ht].
A.1.2 Proof of part (ii) (the case of bt /∈ Ek[ht])
At histories (ht, bt) with bt /∈ Ek[ht], the highest cost type in the principal’s support ck[ht]
does not take the productive action. We prove this in Lemma A.1 below, and use the
lemma to prove part (ii) of the Theorem.
Lemma A.1. Fix any equilibrium (σ, µ) and history ht. If bt /∈ Ek[ht], then an agent with
cost ck[ht] does not take the productive action at time t.
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Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that an agent with type ck[ht] does take
the action at time t if bt /∈ Ek[ht]. Since, by Lemma 0, this type’s payoff must equal
zero at all histories, it must be that the offer that is accepted is Tt = ck[ht]. We now
show that if the principal makes such an offer, then all agent types will accept the offer
and take the productive action. To see this, suppose some types reject the offer. Let
cj be the highest cost type that rejects the offer. By Lemma 0, type cj’s continuation
payoff is zero, because this type becomes the highest cost in the support of the principal’s
beliefs following a rejection. However, this type can guarantee himself a payoff of at least
(1− δ)(Tt − cj) = (1− δ)(ck[ht] − cj) > 0 by accepting the current offer. Hence, it cannot
be that some types reject offer Tt = ck[ht] when type ck[ht] accepts it.
It then follows that if type ck[ht] accepts the offer, then the principal will not learn
anything about the agent’s type. Since bt /∈ Ek[ht], her flow payoff from making the offer
is (1 − δ)(bt − ck[ht]) < 0. Consider an alternative PBE which is identical to the original
PBE, except that at history (ht, bt) the principal makes an offer T = 0, and all agent
types in C[ht] reject this offer. The principal’s beliefs after this period are equal to µ[ht]
regardless of the agent’s action. Note that it is optimal for all types to reject this offer.
Moreover, since bt /∈ Ek[ht], the payoff that the principal gets from this PBE is larger than
her payoff under the original PBE. But this cannot be, since the original PBE is in ΣK .
Hence, if bt /∈ Ek[ht], an agent with type ck[ht] does not take the action at time t.
Proof of part (ii) when X(bt, Ek[ht]) > 1− δ. Fix a history (ht, bt) with bt /∈ Ek[ht] and
X(bt, Ek[ht]) > 1− δ. We show that at such histories, all agent types take action a = 0.
By Lemma A.1, type ck[ht] doesn’t take the productive action at time t if bt /∈ Ek[ht].
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a nonempty set of types C ( C[ht]
that do take the productive action. Let cj = maxC. By Lemma 0 type cj obtains a
continuation payoff of zero starting in period t + 1. Hence, type cj receives a payoff
(1− δ)(Tt− cj) + δ0 from taking the productive action in period t. Since this payoff must
be weakly larger than the payoff the agent would obtain by not taking the action and
mimicking the strategy of agent ck[ht] in all future periods, it follows that
(1− δ)(Tt − cj) ≥ V (σ,µ)k[ht] [ht, bt] + (ck[ht] − cj)A
(σ,µ)
k[ht]
[ht, bt]
≥ (ck[ht] − cj)X(bt, Ek[ht])
> (1− δ)(ck[ht] − cj), (5)
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where the first line follows from incentive compatibility, the second line follows from the
fact that at′,k[ht] = 1 for all times t
′ ≥ t such that bt′ ∈ Ek[ht] (by the result of part (i)
proven above), and the third line follows since X(bt, Ek[ht]) > 1 − δ by assumption. The
inequalities in (5) imply that Tt > ck[ht]. But then by Lemma 0, it would be strictly
optimal for type ck[ht] to deviate by accepting the transfer and taking the productive
action, a contradiction. So it must be that all agent types in C[ht] take action at = 0.
Proof of part (ii) when X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1 − δ. Fix a history ht and let bt ∈ B\Ek[ht]
be such that X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1− δ. We start by showing that the set of types that accept
the offer has the form C− = {ck ∈ C[ht] : ck < ck∗} for some ck∗ ∈ C[ht]. The result is
clearly true if no agent type takes the action, in which case set ck∗ = minC[ht]; or if only
an agent with type minC[ht] takes the action, in which case set ck∗ equal to the second
lowest cost in C[ht].
Therefore, suppose that an agent with type larger than minC[ht] takes the action,
and let cj∗ ∈ C[ht] be the highest cost agent that takes the action. Since bt /∈ Ek[ht], by
Lemma A.1 it must be that cj∗ < ck[ht]. By Lemma 0, type cj∗ ’s payoff is (1− δ)(Tt− cj∗),
since from date t+ 1 onwards this type will be the highest cost type in the support of the
principal’s beliefs if the principal observes that the agent took the action at time t. Let
ck∗ = min{ck ∈ C[ht] : ck > cj∗}. By incentive compatibility, it must be that
(1− δ)(Tt − cj∗) ≥ V (σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] + (ck∗ − cj∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt], (6)
since type cj∗ can obtain the right-hand side of (6) by mimicking type ck∗ . Furthermore,
type ck∗ can guarantee himself a payoff of (1− δ)(Tt− ck∗) by taking the action at time t
and never taking the action again. Therefore, it must be that
V
(σ,µ)
k∗ [ht, bt] ≥ (1− δ)(Tt − ck∗) ≥ (1− δ)(cj∗ − ck∗) + V (σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] + (ck∗ − cj∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt]
=⇒ 1− δ ≥ A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] (7)
where the second inequality in the first line follows from (6).
We now show that all types ci ∈ C[ht] with ci < cj∗ also take the action at time t.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not true, and let ci∗ ∈ C[ht] be the
highest cost type lower than cj∗ that does not take the action. The payoff that this type
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would get by taking the action at time t and then mimicking type cj∗ is
V
(σ,µ)
i∗→j∗ [ht, bt] = (1− δ)(Tt − cj∗) + (cj∗ − ci∗)A(σ,µ)j∗ [ht, bt]
= (1− δ)(Tt − cj∗) + (cj∗ − ci∗)(1− δ +X(bt, Ej∗))
≥ (cj∗ − ci∗)(1− δ +X(bt, Ej∗)) + V (σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] + (ck∗ − cj∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt]
(8)
where the first line follows from the fact that type cj∗ is the highest type in the support of
the principal’s beliefs in period t+ 1, so he receives a payoff of 0 from t+ 1 onwards; the
second follows from part (i) and Lemma A.1, which imply that type cj∗ takes the action
in periods t′ ≥ t + 1 if and only if bt′ ∈ Ej∗ (note that type cj∗ also takes the action at
time t); and the third inequality follows from (6).
On the other hand, by Lemma 0(ii), the payoff that type ci∗ gets by rejecting the offer
at time t is equal to the payoff she would get by mimicking type ck∗ , since the principal
will believe for sure that the agent’s type is not in {ci∗+1, ..., cj∗} ⊆ C[ht] after observing
a rejection. That is, type ci∗ ’s payoff is
V
(σ,µ)
i∗ [ht, bt] = V
(σ,µ)
i∗→k∗ [ht, bt] = V
(σ,µ)
k∗ [ht, bt] + (ck∗ − ci∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] (9)
From equations (8) and (9), it follows that
V
(σ,µ)
i∗ [ht, bt]− V (σ,µ)i∗→j∗ [ht, bt] ≤ (cj∗ − ci∗)
[
A
(σ,µ)
k∗ [ht, bt]− [1− δ +X(bt, Ej∗)]
]
< 0,
where the strict inequality follows after using (7). Hence, type ci∗ strictly prefers to mimic
type cj∗ and take the action at time t than to not take it, a contradiction. Hence, all
types ci ∈ C[ht] with ci ≤ cj∗ take the action at t, and so the set of types taking the
action takes the form C− = {cj ∈ C[ht] : cj < ck∗}.
Finally, it is clear that in equilibrium, the transfer that the principal will pay at time
t if all agents with type ci ∈ C− take the action is given by (∗). The payoff that an
agent with type cj∗ = maxC
− gets by accepting the offer is (1 − δ)(Tt − cj∗), while her
payoff from rejecting the offer and mimicking type ck∗ = minC[ht]\C− is V (σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] +
(ck∗ − cj∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt]. Hence, the lowest offer that a cj∗-agent accepts is (1 − δ)Tt =
(1− δ)cj∗ + V (σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt] + (ck∗ − cj∗)A(σ,µ)k∗ [ht, bt].
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A.1.3 Proof of Existence and Uniqueness
For each history ht and each cj ∈ C[ht], let Cj+[ht] = {ci ∈ C[ht] : ci ≥ cj}. For each
history ht and each state realization bt ∈ B, let
A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] := (1− δ)E(σ,µ)Cj+[ht]
[ ∞∑
t′=t+1
δt
′−tat′,j|(ht, bt)
]
,
where E(σ,µ)Cj+[ht][·] is the expectation operator over the equilibrium strategies when the
beliefs of the principal at time t + 1 have support Cj+[ht]. That is, A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] is the
expected discounted fraction of time that an agent with type cj takes the action after
history (ht, bt) if the beliefs of the principal at time t+ 1 have support Cj+[ht].
Lemma A.2. Fix any equilibrium (σ, µ) and history (ht, bt). The following are equivalent:
1. There exists an offer T ≥ 0 such that types ci ∈ C[ht], ci < cj, accept at time t and
types ci ∈ C[ht], ci ≥ cj reject.
2. A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] ≤ 1− δ.
Proof. First, suppose such an offer T exists, and let ck be the highest type in C[ht]
that accepts T . Let cj be the lowest type in C[ht] that rejects the offer, and note that
ck < cj. By Lemma 0, the expected discounted payoff that an agent with type ck gets from
accepting the offer is (1−δ)(T −ck)+δ0. The payoff that type ck obtains by rejecting the
offer and mimicking type cj from time t+ 1 onwards is V
(σ,µ)
j [ht, bt] + (cj− ck)A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt].
Therefore, the offer T that the principal makes must satisfy
(1− δ)(T − ck) ≥ V (σ,µ)j [ht, bt] + (cj − ck)A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt]. (10)
Note that an agent with type cj can guarantee himself a payoff of (1−δ)(T −cj) by taking
the action in period t and then never taking it again; therefore, incentive compatibility
implies
V
(σ,µ)
j [ht, bt] ≥ (1− δ)(T − cj) ≥ V (σ,µ)j [ht, bt] + (cj − ck)
[
A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt]− (1− δ)
]
=⇒ 1− δ ≥ A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt]
where the second inequality in the first line follows after substituting T from (10).
Suppose next that A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] ≤ 1− δ, and suppose the principal makes offer T such
that (1 − δ)(T − ck) = V (σ,µ)j [ht, bt] + (cj − ck)A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt], which only agents with type
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c` ∈ C[ht], c` ≤ ck are supposed to accept. The payoff that an agent with cost ck obtains
by accepting the offer is (1−δ)(T−ck), which is exactly what he would obtain by rejecting
the offer and mimicking type cj. Hence, type ck has an incentive to accept such an offer.
Similarly, one can check that all types c` ∈ C[ht], c` < ck also have an incentive to accept
the offer. If the agent accepts such an offer and takes the action in period t, the principal
will be believe that the agent’s type lies in {c` ∈ C[ht] : c` ≤ ci}. Note that, in all periods
t′ > t, the principal will never offer Tt′ > ck.
Consider the incentives of an agent with type ci ≥ cj > ck at time t. The payoff that
this agent gets from accepting the offer is (1 − δ)(T − ci), since from t + 1 onwards the
agent will never accept any equilibrium offer. This is because all subsequent offers will be
lower than ck < cj ≤ ci. On the other hand, the agent’s payoff from rejecting the offer is
V
(σ,µ)
i [ht, bt] ≥ V (σ,µ)i→j [ht, bt] = V (σ,µ)j [ht, bt] + (cj − ci)A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt]
≥ (1− δ)(T − ci) = (1− δ)(ck − ci) + V (σ,µ)j [ht, bt] + (cj − ck)A(σ,µ)j+ [ht, bt],
where the second inequality follows since A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] ≤ 1− δ.
The proof of existence and uniqueness relies on Lemma A.2 and uses strong induction on
the cardinality of C[ht]. Clearly, Σ1 is non-empty, and all PBE in Σ1 give the same payoff
to the principal at histories (ht, bt) such that C[ht] = {ck}: in this case, the principal
offers the agent a transfer Tt′ = ck (which the agent accepts) at times t
′ ≥ t such that
bt′ ∈ Ek and offers some transfer Tt′ < ck (which the agent rejects) at times t′ ≥ t such
that bt′ /∈ Ek.
Suppose next that Σk−1 is non-empty for all k ≤ n − 1, and that for all k ≤ n − 1,
all PBE in Σk give the principal the same payoff at histories (ht, bt) with |C[ht]| = k.
We now show that Σn is non-empty, and that all PBE in Σn give the principal the same
payoff at histories (ht, bt) with |C[ht]| = n.
Consider a history (ht, bt) with |C[ht]| = n. If bt ∈ Ek[ht], then by part (i) it must be
that all agent types in C[ht] take the action in period t and Tt = ck[ht]; hence, at such
histories
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] = (1− δ)(bt − ck[ht]) + δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1]|bt
]
If bt /∈ Ek[ht] and X(bt, Ek[ht]) > 1 − δ, then by part (ii), all agent types in C[ht] don’t
take the action (in this case, the principal makes an offer T small enough that all agents
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reject); hence, at such states
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] = δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1]|bt
]
In either case, the principal doesn’t learn anything about the agent’s type, since all types
of agents in C[ht] take the same action, so her beliefs don’t change.
Finally, consider states bt /∈ Ek[ht] with X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1− δ. Two things can happen
at such a state: (a) all types of agents in C[ht] don’t take the action, or (b) a strict subset
of types in C[ht] don’t take the action and the rest do.
17 In case (a), the principal’s beliefs
at time t+ 1 would be the same as her beliefs at time t, and her payoffs are
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] = δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1]|bt
]
In case (b), the types of the agent not taking the action has the form Cj+[ht] = {ci ∈
C[ht] : ci ≥ cj} for some cj ∈ C[ht]. So in case (b) the support of the beliefs of the principal
at time t + 1 would be Cj+[ht] if the agent doesn’t take the action, and C[ht]\Cj+[ht] if
he does.
By Lemma A.2, there exists an offer that types Cj+[ht] reject and types C[ht]\Cj+[ht]
accept if and only if A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] ≤ 1 − δ. Note that, by the induction hypothesis,
A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] is uniquely determined.
18 Let C∗[ht, bt] = {ci ∈ C[ht] : A(σ,µ)i+ [ht, bt] ≤ 1− δ}.
Without loss of generality, renumber the types in C[ht] so that C[ht] = {c1, ..., ck[ht]}, with
c1 < ... < ck[ht]. For each ci ∈ C∗[ht, bt], let
T ∗t,i−1 = ci−1 +
1
1− δ
(
V
(σ,µ)
i [ht, bt] + A
(σ,µ)
i+ [ht, bt](ci − ci−1)
)
be the offer that leaves an agent with type ci−1 indifferent between accepting and rejecting
when all types in Ci+[ht] reject the offer and all types in C[ht]\Ci+[ht] accept. Note that
T ∗t,i−1 is the best offer for a principal who wants to get all agents with types in C[ht]\Ci+[ht]
to take the action and all agents with types in types in Ci+[ht] to not take the action.
Let T = {T ∗t,i−1 : ci ∈ C∗[ht, bt]}. At states bt /∈ Ek[ht] with X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1, the
principal must choose optimally whether to make an offer in T or to make a low offer (for
example, Tt = 0) that all agents reject: an offer Tt = T
∗
t,i−1 would be accepted by types
17By Lemma A.1, in equilibrium an agent with cost ck[ht] doesn’t take the action.
18A
(σ,µ)
j+ [ht, bt] is determined in equilibrium when the principal has beliefs with support Cj+[ht], and
the induction hypothesis states that the continuation equilibrium is unique when the cardinality of the
support of principal’s beliefs is less than n.
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in C[ht]\Ci+[ht] and rejected by types in Ci+[ht], while an offer Tt = 0 will be rejected
by all types. For each offer T ∗t,i−1 ∈ T , let p(T ∗t,i−1) be the probability that offer T ∗t,i−1
is accepted; i.e., the probability that the agent has cost weakly smaller than ci−1. Let
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt, T
∗
t,i−1, at = 1] and U
(σ,µ)[ht, bt, T
∗
t,i−1, at = 0] denote the principal’s expected
continuation payoffs if the offer T ∗t,i−1 ∈ T is accepted and rejected, respectively, at history
(ht, bt). Note that these payoffs are uniquely pinned down by the induction hypothesis:
after observing whether the agent accepted or rejected the offer, the cardinality of the
support of the principal’s beliefs will be weakly lower than n − 1. For all b ∈ B with
X(b, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1− δ, let
U∗(ht, bt) = max
T∈T
{
p(T )((1− δ)(b− T ) + U (σ,µ)[ht, bt, T, 1]) + (1− p(T ))U (σ,µ)[ht, bt, T, 0]
}
and let T (b) be a maximizer of this expression.
Partition the states B as follows:
B1 = Ek[ht]
B2 = {b ∈ B\B1 : X(bt, Ek[ht]) > 1− δ}
B3 = {b ∈ B\B1 : X(bt, Ek[ht]) ≤ 1− δ}
By our arguments above, the principal’s payoff U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] satisfies:
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] =

(1− δ)(b− ck[ht]) + δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1]|bt
]
if bt ∈ B1
δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1|bt
]
if bt ∈ B2
max{U∗(ht, bt), δE
[
U (σ,µ)[ht+1, bt+1]|bt
]} if bt ∈ B3 (11)
Let F be the set of functions from B to R and let Φ : F → F be the operator such that,
for every f ∈ F ,
Φ(f)(b) =

(1− δ)(b− ck[ht]) + δE[f [bt+1]|bt = b] if b ∈ B1
δE[f [bt+1]|bt = b] if b ∈ B2
max{U∗(ht, b), δE[f [bt+1]|bt = b]} if b ∈ B3
One can check that Φ is a contraction of modulus δ < 1, and therefore has a unique
fixed point. Moreover, by (11), the principal’s equilibrium payoffs U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] are a fixed
point of Φ. These two observations together imply that the principal’s equilibrium payoffs
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] are unique. The equilibrium strategies at (ht, bt) can be immediately derived
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from (11). Finally, it can be readily seen that these equilibrium strategies can be taken
to be Markovian with respect to the principal’s beliefs µ[ht] and the shock bt.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Fix a history ht such that |C[ht]| ≥ 2 and without loss of generality renumber the types
so that C[ht] = {c1, ..., ck[ht]} with c1 < ... < ck[ht]. We start by showing that for every
such history, there exists a shock realization b ∈ B with the property that, if bs = b at
time s ≥ t, then the principal makes an offer that a strict subset of the types in C[ht]
accepts.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not true. Note that this implies that
µ[ht′ ] = µ[ht] for every ht′  ht. By Theorem 1, this further implies that after history ht,
the agent only takes the action when the shock is in Ek[ht], and receives a transfer equal
to ck[ht]. Therefore, the principal’s payoff after history (ht, bt) is
U (σ,µ)[ht, bt] = (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−t(bt′ − ck[ht])1{bt′∈Ek[ht]}|bt = b
]
.
Let b ∈ Ek[ht]−1 be such that X(b, Ek[ht]) < 1 − δ. The conditions in the statement of
Proposition 3 guarantee that such a shock b exists. Suppose that the shock at time s ≥ t
is bs = b, and let  > 0 be small enough such that
T = ck[ht]−1 +
1
1− δX(b, Ek[ht])(ck[ht] − ck[ht]−1) +  < ck[ht]. (12)
Note that at history (hs, bs), an offer equal to T is accepted by all types with cost strictly
lower than ck[ht], and is rejected by type ck[ht].
19 The principal’s payoff from making an
offer T conditional on the agent’s type being ck[ht] is U
(σ,µ)[ht, bt]. On the other hand,
when the agent’s type is lower than ck[ht], the principal obtains (1 − δ)(b − T ) at period
t if she offers transfer T , and learns that the agent’s type is not ck[ht]. From period t+ 1
onwards, the principal’s payoff is bounded below by what she could obtain if at all periods
t′ > t she offers Tt′ = ck[ht]−1 whenever bt′ ∈ Ek[ht]−1 (an offer which is accepted by all
types), and offers Tt′ = 0 otherwise (which is rejected by all types). The payoff that the
19By accepting offer T , an agent with cost ci < ck[ht] obtains a payoff of at least (1−δ)(T−ci)+δ0. This
payoff is strictly larger than the payoff of X(b, Ek[ht])(ck[ht] − ci) he obtains by rejecting and continuing
playing the equilibrium.
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principal obtains from following this strategy when the agent’s cost is lower than ck[ht] is
U = (1− δ)(b− T ) + (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=s+1
δt
′−s(bt′ − ck[ht]−1)1{bt′∈Ek[ht]−1}|bs = b
]
= (1− δ)(b− ck[ht]−1 − ) + (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=s+1
δt
′−s(bt′ − ck[ht])1{bt′∈Ek[ht]}|bs = b
]
+ (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=s+1
δt
′−s(bt′ − ck[ht]−1)1{bt′∈Ek[ht]−1\Ek[ht]}|bs = b
]
= U (σ,µ)[ht, b] + (1− δ)(b− ck[ht]−1 − )
+ (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t′=s+1
δt
′−s(bt′ − ck[ht]−1)1{bt′∈Ek[ht]−1\Ek[ht]}|bs = b
]
,
where the second line follows from substituting (12). Since b ∈ Ek[ht]−1, from the third
line it follows that if  > 0 is small enough then U is strictly larger than U (σ,µ)[ht, b]. But
this cannot be, since the proposed strategy profile was an equilibrium. Therefore, for all
histories ht such that |C[ht]| ≥ 2, there exists b ∈ B with the property that at history
(hs, bs) with hs  ht and bs = b the principal makes an offer that a strict subset of the
types in C[ht] accept.
We now use this result to establish the proposition. Note first that this result, together
with the assumption that process {bt} is ergodic, implies that there is long run learning
in equilibrium. This is because as long as C[ht] has two or more elements, there will be
some shock realization at which the principal makes an offer that only a strict subset of
types in C[ht] accepts. And since there are finitely many types and {bt} is ergodic, it is
certain that the principal will end up learning the agent’s type.
Finally, fix a history ht such that C[ht] = {ci}. Then, from time t onwards the princi-
pal’s payoff is U (σ,µ)[ht, b] = (1 − δ)E
[∑∞
t′=t δ
t′−t(bt′ − ci)1{bt′∈Ei}|bt = b
]
= U∗i (b|c = ci),
which is the first best payoff. This and the previous arguments imply that the equilibrium
is long run first best.
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